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MORTGAGE LENDERS AND THE
HOUSING SUPPLY*
Allen R. Bentleyt- and Angus Macbeth#if
Inadequate housing is a major contributor to the social crisis fac-
ing the United States today. The economy has failed to produce the
new housing needed by a growing population, and has been unable
to provide housing at prices within the means of many Americans.
Both government reports and private studies indicate' that the burden
of these failures falls most heavily on the poor, whose continuing frus-
tration and alienation are nurtured in substandard dwellings in squalid
neighborhoods.2
Investment decisions of mortgage lenders have a significant im-
pact on the production and distribution of housing.3 Builders are
characteristically small and under-financed, and must depend on con-
struction loans and take-out financing to produce and market new
* The authors wish to express their thanks to Margaret Ayers, Stuart Beck, David
Calfee, Greg Colvin, Nancy Geilman, Lou Gumper, Christopher Herman, Marc Koplik,
Arthur Kowaloff, James E. Mitchell, and David Thurber, who assisted in conducting the
interviews, and to Professors George Lefcoe and David Trubek, who provided guidance,
support, and encouragement.
t Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1967, Oberlin College; LL.B. 1970, Yale Univer-
sity.
"-" Member of the New York Bar. B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1969, Yale University.
1 See, e.g., PREsmENrs COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HomE (1968) [hereinafter
cited as A DECENT HoE]; Welfeld, A New Framework for Federal Housing Aids, 69
COLUm. L. R v. 1355 (1969).
2 See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COM'N ON CIVIL DisoRDERs, REPORT 467-82 (1968).
8 Cf. N.Y. Times, March 6, 1970, at 79, col. 1. Other variables of course affect the
supply of housing. Increases in cost of materials and labor may cause developers to post-
pone or abandon contemplated construction, or to price the final product beyond the
reach of many Americans; government monetary policy can raise interest rates to levels
that discourage all but the most determined. home purchaser. Yet financial institutions
play a crucial role in determining the availability of housing. See notes 4-6 and accom-
panying text infra.
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homes.4 Individual home purchasers normally lack the substantial
funds needed to purchase without credit and invariably rely on mort-
gage loans as a means of spreading housing costs over time.5
This study focuses on traditional mortgage lenders-savings banks
and savings and loan associations-which are major sources of funds
for both builders and home purchasers.8 On the basis of interviews
with officials of such institutions,7 we have sought to describe two
4 The dependence of the small-scale builder on mortgage financing is described in
Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YA..E L.J. 1271 (1966).
A simplified description of the financing of a typical construction project may be
useful. To pay his subcontractors and materialmen, the builder secures a short term
construction loan, designed to be liquidated when construction is completed. Since the
builder is generally no more able to pay off the construction loan when the project is
completed than when it was begun, however, the construction lender may require the
builder to obtain a take-out commitment from another lender. "Take-out" financing is
simply a long term mortgage secured by the newly constructed buildings, the proceeds of
which are used to repay the construction loan. For present purposes, a consideration of
the role of the interim lender is unnecessary. See generally G. LEFcoE, LAND FINANCE LAW
595-608 (1969). The process is somewhat different in construction of single family homes.
'See Storke & Spears, Subdivision Financing, 28 RocKY MT. L. REV. 549, 555 (1956).
An alternative to the above system, which relies heavily on outside construction funds,
is the developing practice of internal financing of construction by large, diversified corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
5 See L. RODWiN, HOUSING AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 26-29 (1961). Because of this reliance
on mortgage funds, a rise in interest rates or a decrease in available loan funds will deter
home purchases.
6 HousING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT TPENDS, May/June 1969, at 23. See also A.
DIAMOND, MORTGAGE LOAN GROSS FLOws 23, 31 (1968); cf. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING &
CURRENCY, 86th CONG., 2d SEss., A STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT 203-06 (Comm. Print 1960).
7 For a listing of institutions interviewed, see APPENDICEs A & B infra. The New
Haven interviews were conducted between March and June, 1969. Those in Los Angeles
were conducted between June and August, 1968.
No interviews were conducted with officials of pension or retirement funds in either
New Haven or Los Angeles. These sources contributed $8.4 billion, or roughly 2% of
national mortgage funds in 1967. A DECENT HOME 246. The New Haven interviews did
include one brokerage firm, Lomas &c Nettleton, which had placed approximately $12
million in mortgages in the New Haven area for insurance companies, and one life
insurance company, Connecticut General Life, which had a $13 million residential mort-
gage portfolio in New Haven County.
The interviews ranged in length from one-half hour to more than two hours; inter-
viewers were requested to submit complete written reports. The questions and interview
notes are on file at the offices of the Cornell Law Review.
The data was compiled from interviews because we wished to obtain a close-up view
of the operations of individual institutions. We were able to obtain information about
operating practices that could not have been discovered by a review of official reports,
balance sheets, and statements of condition which are submitted to the regulatory agencies.
The methodology and conclusions of our study should be compared with those of
D. HESTEsR, STOCK AND MUTUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY: A STUDY
OF THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERSION (1967). While the report is not entirely
adequate (id. at 11), or free from puzzling discrepancies (id. at 26), it is the most sophisti-
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typical markets exhibiting differing investment preferences. The mar-
kets examined are New Haven8 and Los Angeles;9 of the two, Los
Angeles has experienced a more rapid and steady expansion of the
housing supply.10 Predominant mortgage lenders in each city differ
markedly in age," in form of organization, 2 and in size.'3 The study
cated yet conducted. The findings and conclusions presented here do not conflict with
those of Professor Hester.
8 See APPENDIX A infra.
9 See APPENDIX B infra. Factual statements obtained in interviews with savings
institutions will hereinafter be supported by reference to the identification initials
assigned to various institutions in the appendices.
10 Although statistics for individual states are not available, the spirited pace of
housing construction in California is reflected by the unusually high annual average
vacancy rates of units available for rental or sale in the western region. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, HOUsING VACANCIES, ser.
H-111, No. 51, at 20-21 (1968). This vacancy rate is particularly striking in view of the
rapid increase in the population of the western region. From 1960 to 1970, the popula-
tion of the region rose at a rate of 24.1% while that of the northeast rose only at a
rate of 9.8%. BUREAU OF TH-E CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 13 (1971).
In absolute terms, data for 1969 indicates that California remains the most active
market for new housing construction. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CONSTRUCTION REPORTS, HOUSING AUTHORIZED BY BUILDING PERMITS AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS
1969, ser. C-40, No. 13, at 20 (1970).
As a result of considerable overbuilding, real estate agents in Los Angeles at one
point were offering homes for rent with no required security deposit and six months free
rent, simply to get signatures on leases and occupancy of houses. GWSL.
11 The New Haven savings banks operate under charters granted immediately after
the Civil War. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. R.EV. § 36-117 (1958) (general state law to prevail
over inconsistent charter provision). Concerning savings and loan associations chartered
in Connecticut, a state official commented that, except for the Connecticut Savings and
Loan in Hartford, owned entirely by Blacks and chartered in 1968,
we haven't had any applications for new savings and loans for years .... I guess
the last charter granted was to Naugatuck in 1922. The main reason why S&Ls
aren't more popular is that Connecticut is a big savings bank state. We've got
69 of them, founded around the Civil War-they're old and wealthy.
Interview with Reinhard J. Bardeck, Deputy Banking Comm'r, Conn. Banking Dep't,
Jan. 27, 1969. Federally-chartered savings and loan associations date from the Depres-
sion when the chartering of such institutions was first authorized by federal statute.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970). Many of the Los Angeles institutions are much younger, dating
from 1945 and the post-War boom.
12 Both California and Connecticut charter savings and loan associations. CAL. CONST.
art. 12, § 5; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 36-173(2) (Supp. 1969). In Connecticut, the state-
chartered savings and loan associations are mutual or depositor owned. Id. §§ 36-175,
-178 (1958). This form of organization exists in all states and predominates among savings
and loan associations nationally. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, COMM. ON BANK-
ING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., COMPARATIVE REGULATIONS OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 109 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as COMPARATIVE REGULATIONS]. The vast
majority of these state-chartered institutions are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Id. at 101. FSLIC regulation provides a degree of uni-
formity in institutional operations and policies. 12 C.F.R. §§ 563, 565-66 (1971).
An overwhelming majority of state-chartered savings and loan associations in Los
1972]
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also reveals major variations in the procedures of mortgage lenders
in the two cities. The impact of these variations on housing demon-
strates the desirability of fundamental change in the internal structure,
size, and lending policy of some savings institutions.14
Angeles are organized as stock companies under CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 5068-69 (West 1958).
This form of organization is permitted in 18 states, but its development has been con-
centrated in a few jurisdictions, principally California, Ohio, and Texas. COMPARATIvE
REGULATIONS 101, 109. Federally-insured associations in this category are regulated by
FSLIC in the same manner as state-chartered mutuals. Connecticut does not permit this
form of banking. In Los Angeles, a few state-chartered mutual associations, which were
founded before stock associations were permitted, continue to function. See In re Pacific
Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 99 P.2d 251 (1940).
Federally-chartered savings and loan associations in both New Haven and Los Angeles
are mutual associations. 12 US.C. § 1464 (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) (1971). In 1963 ap-
proximately 30%, of all savings and loan associations were under federal charter. Com-
PARATIVE REGULATIONS 101. These institutions are regulated by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (12 U.S.C. § 1464(i) (1970)), and are subject to the same regulation by FSLIC
as state-chartered savings and loan associations.
Connecticut, but not California, charters mutual savings banks that are controlled
by independent boards of directors. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 86-117 to -134 (1958). Mutual
savings banks exist in 18 states, predominantly in the northeast, where, as in Connecticut,
most charters were issued before the growth of savings and loan associations and the
acceptance of savings deposits by commercial banks. Note 11 supra. See G. MUNN, ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 665 (6th ed. 1962). The statutes governing these institu-
tions vary from state to state in a number of ways, e.g., in types of loans, terms of loans,
maximum interest rates, geographic area of operation, and allowable personal loans.
Virtually all mutual savings banks, except those in Massachusetts, have their deposits
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (COMPARATIVE REGULATIONS 68),
and this again provides a degree of national regulation over their operations and policies.
12 C.F.R. §§ 329, 335 (1971).
Federally-chartered commercial banks are organized as stock companies (12 U.S.C. § 22
(1970)), as are the state-chartered commercial banks in Connecticut, known as state bank
and trust companies (CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 36-53(2) (1958)). No commercial banks were
interviewed in Los Angeles and they play a comparatively passive role in the mortgage
market in New Haven. See note 14 infra.
The New Haven interviews included nearly every traditional mortgage lender in
that city, as well as institutions in neighboring cities that operated branches in the New
Haven area. The Los Angeles interviews necessarily included only some of the savings
and loan associations in that city.
13 Four of the seven largest savings and loan associations in the country, with assets
ranging from $700 to $2,732 million, as of the end of 1967 were located in Los Angeles.
SAvINGs & LOAN NEws, Feb. 1968, at 14. Although smaller than the Los Angeles Savings
and Loan Associations, all the institutions interviewed in New Haven were not of insig-
nificant size. Certain institutions boasted moderately large assets: CSB ($244.1 million);
FFSLNH ($177.2 million); NHSB ($269.7 million); and PST $545.6 million). These con-
trast sharply, however, with the much smaller institutions dispersed among them: DSB
($32.2 million); HNB ($13.0 million); NHSL ($21.7 million); ONB ($6.2 million); and
SFSLNH ($28S million). See APPENDICEs A & B infra.
14 New Haven (population 138,000) and Los Angeles (population 2,814,000) obviously
differ greatly in size. ButEAu OF niE CENSUS, U.S. DE,'T or COMMmRcE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
oF THE UNrrD STATES: 1971, at 22 (1971). The contrasting behavior we observed might be
attributable to the size of the community in which the institution functions, not to its
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I . .. .
MORtGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN AND Los -ANGEtrES
A. Housing Construction
To have a direct impact on the production of housing, a mortgage
lender must either deal with private developers 5 or, as is authorized
in both New Haven and Los Angeles,16 engage in development itself.
organizational form or size. While community size cannot be ruled out with mathematical
certainty, there is evidence indicating that it is not a significant variable. If community
size were an influential factor, one would expect that differences in the operations of
similarly sized institutions in the same community, regardless of organizational form,
would be minor when compared with inter-city differences. We found, however, that the
large stock associations in Los Angeles were uniformly aggressive, while at least one of
the large mutual savings institutions (CFSL) was quite conservative. Moreover, when one
compares the financial statements of California state-chartered stock associations with
those of state-chartered mutual savings banks of similar size, the mutual institutions
appear more risk-averting when rated according to such indices of risk as percentage of
real estate owned, percentage of loans made to facilitate the sale of property, and
construction loan originations. See G. LFcoE, supra note 4, at 339-40.
No valid intra-city comparisons are possible for the New Haven institutions, because
no savings and loan associations or other major residential mortgage lenders organized
with capital stock are authorized in that community. To be sure, our interviews included
the commercial banks in New Haven, which are stock corporations, but the lending
policies of these institutions cannot be compared with those of the mutual savings banks
and savings and loan associations in that city. Commercial banks operate under entirely
different statutory authorizations than do residential mortgage lenders; they concentrate
on short term commercial lending and do not perceive the major thrust of their operations
as making residential mortgage loans.
Of course, some institutions in Los Angeles have grown to a size which no New
Haven institution could realistically hope to attain. To the extent that institutional size
affects behavior, community size will be a factor in that it places limits on the growth of
the institutions located within it.
Finally, patterns of community development and expansion of the housing supply
have been closely associated with the boom of stock associations in Los Angeles. Cause and
effect in this relationship have been extremely difficult to separate. Even Professor
Hester's meticulous study was unable to control all the variables in the different markets,
or communities, in which the institutions operate. See generally D. HESTM, supra note 7,
at 5-6.
The association of expansion of the housing supply with the prevalence of stock
associations, taken with the data hereinafter presented (notes 14-70 and accompanying
text infra), argues for the chartering of stock associations in areas like New Haven, where
they are not now authorized.
15 Financial institutions such as those considered here will typically deal with the
private developer, often a builder from the community. Public developers can often
avoid the intermediary costs which a financial institution must impose. However, public
agencies occasionally turn to banks and savings associations for mortgage funds. Thus,
many New Haven institutions participated in a consortium which provided funds for the
Church Street South urban renewal project in, that city. NSB, NHSB, UNHTC, and
FNHNB.
18 See 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) (federal savings and loans); CAL. TiN. CODE § 6705 (West
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Either alternative entails more risk than the ordinary mortgage loan
made to finance an individual borrower's purchase of an existing
dwelling unit.
Loans to finance construction are more risky because, although
the mortgage may cover the land on which construction is proposed,17
the buildings that will furnish most of the security have not been built
and often not been rented or sold.'8 The lender thus runs the risk
that the demand for housing in a particular area will suddenly decline,
reducing the value of his security; 19 that the housing when constructed
will be of inferior quality;20 and that the developer and construction
funds will disappear before construction is completed.21
Equity investment in new construction is also subject to the vicis-
situdes of local, regional, and national economies. In addition, the
lender-builder must absorb in full whatever losses are incurred since
he has given up the protection, however imperfect, that a mortgage
would provide. This element of risk is offset at least in part by the
absence of any risk that the borrower will abscond with the loan pro-
1958) (California state-chartered institutions); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 36-180, -178(n), (o)
(1958) (Connecticut savings and loan associations and savings banks).
17 Lenders frequently require that the construction borrower own "free and clear"
the land on which he intends to build. This provides a measure of safety beyond the
projected value of the housing to be constructed.
18 Without a substantial amount of his proposed building leased before he starts
construction, the builder must depend on short-term construction financing-
loans at relatively high rates of interest-to carry him through the building
phase. The lending practice once was to provide long-term, lower-rate loans if up
to 80 per cent of the proposed building were under lease ....
N.Y. Times, March 7, 1971, § 8 (Real Estate), at 8, col. 6.
19 For this reason, elaborate economic projections of growth and employment are
made by lenders contemplating engaging in large scale development lending. GWSL.
20 Inferior quality will normally be a major concern of the lender, since it will affect
the value of the security in event of foreclosure. In addition, home purchasers injured by
defects in homes built with construction loans have been held to have a cause of action
against the lender on a negligence theory. Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.
2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1968) (en banc). But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 3434
(West 1970), limiting Connor to cases where the lender acted "outside the scope of
activities of a lender of money."
21 "The completed building is a better risk than a builder's dream and that's why
rates are lower and mortgages are larger." N.Y. Times, March 10, 1971, at 60, col. 4.
As a means of minimizing the chance of outright fraud, construction lenders regularly
make periodic disbursements of funds as construction progresses and require completion
certificates, vouchers (GWSL), on-site inspections (ESL), or certificates of occupancy
(NHSB) as a prerequisite to each successive disbursement. One institution (ESL) utilized
a confidential private service which evaluated the credit of construction borrowers.
A Connecticut statute expressly requires that construction loans made by Connecticut
savings and loan associations be geared to the process of construction and not proceed at
any faster rate. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 86-178(h)(6) (1958). For a similar provision for
Connecticut savings banks; see id. § 36-99(11)(d).
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ceeds and by the theoretically unlimited yield which the investment
may furnish.
No lender could reasonably be expected to charge the same in-
terest rate for construction mortgages as for other loans in his portfolio.
For the reasons just indicated, construction loans are less effectively
secured than individual purchase loans, and builders are generally in
no position to relieve the lender's fears by providing fully adequate
security. The lender will therefore normally demand higher interest
rates for construction loans. Since construction loans turn over in
months, not years, and often require on-site inspections and periodic
disbursements by the lender, one might expect an institution to charge
somewhat higher rates to cover higher administrative costs as well.
Thus a differential between interest rates for construction loans and
those for individual home purchase loans appears essential before a
lender can obtain an acceptable return. Los Angeles lenders employing
such a rate differential viewed construction loans as an important means
of increasing their overall earnings as well.22
Interest rates charged by the New Haven lenders, however, exhib-
ited no such differential; only rarely did New Haven lenders make
construction loans at rates higher than those for individual home pur-
chase financing. 23 Apparently unwilling to assume the underwriting
function, the New Haven institutions originated loans characterized
by an overall uniformity of interest rates. This uniformity of rates
may indicate that the New Haven institutions have taken steps to
22 Of course, the higher rates that a lender can command for construction funds do
not ensure that such loans will be more profitable in the long run than individual pur-
chase loans. That portion of the higher return which represents self-insurance against
increased risk theoretically should not be regarded as net profit but should be held in
reserve against future losses. Nevertheless, in Los Angeles the prevalent assumption was
that the higher rate of return would more than cover the higher risk. One official, comment-
ing on the home improvement loans made by his association, stated: "They entail a high
risk, being unsecured, and we have to be there knocking at the door to collect our
money. Collection costs are expensive. But we make a much higher rate of return." CFSL.
For economic studies of the relationship between risk and rate of return, see W. FE.-
NER, PROBABILrTY AND PROFIT (1965); Arditti, Risk and the Required Return on Equity, 22
J. FiN. 19 (1967). For one attempt at quantification of the relationship, see Fisher & Hall,
Risk and Corporate Rates of Return, Dec. 27, 1967 (unpublished), reprinted in Hearings
on the Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
5, at 2120 (1968). Our study makes no attempt at such precise quantification.
23 DSB, FFSLNH, FNHNB, NHSB, NHSL, and SNBNH made no differentiation be-
tween construction and individual purchase loans in fixing interest rates. PST (the largest
institution interviewed in New Haven) charged 1 of 1% more for construction loans used
to build structures which were not to be occupied by owners, but otherwise made no
distinction.
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eliminate certain elements of risk, with the result that the construc-
tion loans they do make are no more risky than loans made to finance
the purchase of' existing properties. Thus many New Haven institu-
tions refuse to lend to builders with whom they have not previously
dealt.24 In addition, the lender may decide not to gamble on the demand
for new housing and may instead finance primarily the construction
of custom-built homes, that is, those which, prior to construction, have
committed purchasers. 25 Whether cause or effect, the absence of any
variation in rates has been coupled with a restriction of construction
lending to extremely "safe" borrowers and uses. The erection of fi-
nancing barriers to the entry, of new builders and the reluctance to
finance larger, more speculative projects have placed severe limitations
on housing production in New Haven.
New Haven institutions were even more chary of the opportunity
to engage in equity investment. Despite the advantages of such in-
vestment as a hedge against inflation and rising interest rates paid
depositors, 28 only one of the institutions interviewed reported any
involvement in real estate equity investment.27 This absence of insti-
tutional participation in housing development further restricts new
construction.
In contrast, the Los Angeles mortgage lenders whom we inter-
viewed adjusted their interest rates in conformity with the abstract
description of market behavior previously set forth.28 They uniformly
charged more-sometimes as much as six or eight percent more-for
construction loans than for .individual purchase loans29 and. were far
more active in housing construction lending than the New Haven
24 FFSLNH, FNHNB, and NHSB.
25 CTC, NHSB, and PST. A federal institution in neighboring New London,
Connecticut reported that it made construction loans
to individuals, workers, who have gotten together a couple of thousand dollars
and want to get financing to build their own homes. We give heavy consideration
to this kind of "sweat equity." We've had very good luck with this kind of loan,
particularly because the man has put so much of himself into the security. The
rates are about the same as for other loans.
Interview with William T. Douton, Jr., vice President, New London Federal Savings &
Loan, Nov. 24, 1968.
-28 Wall St. J., July 15, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
27 PST reported owning land worth about $125,000 in Bridgeport, Connecticut
which it had acquired as sponsor for a private -renewal project. Bridgeport reportedly has
not established a public urban renewal agency.
28 See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
29 BSL, ESL, FSL, LSL, SMSL, and USL. CoFSL, however, stated that returns from its
construction loans were about the same as, or- slightly ,less than, yields on its purchase
loans.
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institutions.80 The amount of housing construction they financed was
significant.3 1
Unlike the New Haven institutions, Los Angeles state-chartered
savings and loan associations expressed a willingness to experiment
with real estate equity investment.3 2 One such institution was com-
pleting its first small project of about twenty-five homes and intended
to invest as much of its assets as authorized by law in similar projects.33
B. Individual Home Mortgages
The largest proportion of the assets of all of the institutions inter-
viewed was invested in home purchase loans. In the foreseeable future,
traditional mortgage lenders will continue to view home purchase fi-
nancing as the mainstay of their operations. Moreover, because mort-
gage financing is essential to the individual home purchaser, mortgage
lenders will continue to be the primary screening agents in the dis-
tribution of owner occupied dwellings. The criteria used by loan
officers in choosing among loan applicants is a critical threshold that
members of lower income or minority groups-the marginal loan ap-
plicants84-must surmount in order to attain home ownership and
the advantages that go with it.85
30 FSL (25% of portfolio in early 1960's); GWSL (35% at one time; 10-15% in 1968);
LSL (25% of portfolio); CFSL (as high as 60%; 20% in 1968).
31 We have done a great deal of tract financing here at Cal Fed; at times we have
been financing as many as 7,000 or 8,000 homes in new developments, homes in
construction on 4,000 acres 'of land. We have had as much as 60% of our port-
folio in construction loans .... We make what we call community development
loans-loans on a tract of land for homes, stores, and various community, facilities.
CFSL.
32 See note 14 supra.
33 "If sales continue to progress this nicely," the president of this institution reported,
"we stand to make a profit of $4 million on each of the big tracts already purchased for
possible development over the next four years. That could represent quite an addition to
our net profits." Interview with Elwood A. Teague, President, United Financial Corp., July
25, 1968.
34 The group to which we refer excludes the very poor whom the private market is
incapable of adequately serving. There is no way for private owners to make a profit by
housing the poor in decent standard housing except through some form of aid or by
demanding excessive payments from the poor. This fact must be faced." NATONAL CoM!'N
ON URBAN PROBLEmS, BUIING THE AMERcAN Crry 93 (1968). We are concerned with
those on the margin of the private market. Cf. Contract Buyers League v, F & F Inv. Co.,
300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
35 It is quite possible that the unwillingness of established mortgage lenders to make
what are perceived as more risky loans has forced large numbers of middle income and
minority group citizens to defer purchasing homes and to lose the various financial benefits
and psychological rewards which home .ownership provides. In addition, individuals who
wish to purchase homes notwithstanding the refusal of institutional lenders to provide
mortgage funds may be forced to pay excessive. rates to unscrupulous lenders operating
1972]
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The basic process of loan origination and the standards for eval-
uating individual loan applications are similar in both New Haven
and Los Angeles 6 While an occasional institution in Los Angeles
actively seeks borrowers by offering finder's fees to brokers and other
correspondents, 8 7 in most cases borrowers approach the lender directly,
walking into a convenient institution or returning to one with which
they have had prior dealings. The applicant is referred to a loan officer
who conducts an initial interview, during which he obtains the location
and description of the property on which the mortgage is sought. The
applicant is given a form that seeks information about his outstanding
debts, his credit history, and his income.38 He returns to the institu-
tion several days later with the completed form. In the intervening
period the property is appraised and the applicant's credit checked
with references he has given or with the local credit bureau.3 9 If the
beyond the pale of ethics and on the borders of legality. See Contract Buyers League v.
F & F Inv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il. 1969).
Among the tax advantages available to homeowners are deductions for interest paid
on the mortgage (26 U.S.C. § 163 (1970)), and for state and local taxes paid on the
property (id. § 164).
For a discussion of the exclusionary impact of FHA and VA lending policies, and of
the inflated costs of ghetto home ownership, see G. STERNam , TnE TENEMENT LANDLO
149-51, 186-89 (1966).
36 Our study did not focus on the process of construction loan origination except
insofar as we dealt with possible barriers to potential construction borrowers. See note 24
and accompanying text supra.
37 BHFSL. ESL solicited borrowers through extensive personal contacts.
38 A general rule applied by many institutions is that the value of the property
should not exceed 2.5 times the annual income of the borrower. An alternative standard
is that monthly mortgage payments should not exceed a borrower's weekly income. Some
institutions refine their calculations by computing net weekly income after payment of
other fixed obligations.
89 In New Haven, it appears that if the applicant's credit record, as furnished by
credit bureau sources, contains evidence of a single irregularity it may preclude the grant-
ing of mortgage funds. There were exceptions, however. NHSB reported that poor credit
history could be overcome if a good credit record had been maintained for two years or
more. DSB stated that the extent to which the applicant's credit record would be investi-
gated depended upon the amount of the requested loan; a low downpayment would require
a full credit report, while a borrower with a poor credit record would be approved if he
could make a 50% downpayment.
The importance of credit reports in deciding upon mortgage applications immediately
calls to mind the various studies which have criticized, not only the potential for invasion
of privacy which such reports entail, but also the danger of inaccuracy inherent in that
the subject of the report is not informed of its contents and has no opportunity to
challenge it. See generally S. WHEEPit, ON REcopa: FLs AND Dossums iN AmmucAN LIx
(1969); Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONrxEmp. PROB. 342 (1966); Note, Protecting the Subjects of
Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035 (1971). There is no indication in the interviews that any
of the institutions which we interviewed informed applicants whom they rejected on the
basis of unfavorable credit reports of the reason for their rejection. Nor is there any
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pioperty is appraised at sufficient value,40 loan terms are discussed
when the applicant returns. The mortgage may then be agreed upon
without further delay.
Although this basic procedure is the same in both cities, the cri-
teria considered important by lenders in New Haven and Los Angeles
in evaluating loan applicants diverge.
1. New Haven
The New Haven institutions gave explicit consideration to three
factors that were not mentioned in the Los Angeles interviews-the
applicant's depositor status, the stability of his marriage, and his moral
character. Early in the initial conversation preceding discussion of loan
terms or security, an overwhelming majority of the loan officers in
New Haven asked the prospective borrower whether he maintained
a savings account in the institution from which he was seeking a mort-
gage loan.4' The question was apparently motivated by a desire to
determine whether the applicant had any prior relationship with the
lender, rather than to ensure that there was personal security for the
loan.42 While the presence of savings deposits did not guarantee that
indication that the institutions permitted mortgage applicants to rebut or explain unfavor-
able credit reports. In general, very little sensitivity to this issue was observed.
40 The loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is a critical factor in every loan package. See Von
Furstenberg, Default Risk on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages as a Function of the Terms
of Financing: A Quantitative Analysis, 24 J. FIN. 459 (1969). Von Furstenberg found that
at high LTV levels small increases in the ratio had a very large impact on the default rate.
An increase in LTV from 90% to 91% increased the default rate by 16%; an increase in
LTV from 96% to 97% increased the default rate by 50%.
UNHTC indicated that interest rates charged to its borrowers varied with initial
LTV, with lower rates being charged those borrowers who provided a larger initial equity.
SNBNH reported that it would impose a lower LTV ceiling if the building offered as
security were located in what the bank considered a bad neighborhood. See comments of
DSB, supra note 39.
Maximum LTV is set by law. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 7152-53 (West 1958) (70%
and 80%); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. §§ 36-99(8) to -99(10) (1958) (50%, 75%, and 90%); 12
C.F.R. § 545.6-1(a) (1971) (75%, subject to exceptions). Some New Haven institutions follow
a policy of remaining cautiously below the statutorily permitted levels. NSB, HNB.
41 DSB, FFSLNH, NHSB, FNHNB, and SNBNH reported that they would favor
depositors in periods in which tight money made rationing necessary. PST stated that if
a loan applicant were marginal, he would be given "the benefit of the doubt" if he were
a depositor. UNHTC imposed a strict requirement that all its borrowers be depositors,
while NHSL evidently preferred depositors even in the absence of a tight money market.
HNB stated that since it could not satisfy the demands of even its depositors for mortgage
money, an applicant could only obtain a mortgage if he were an exceptionally large, long
term depositor. CSB reported that it had favored depositors only during the tight money
crisis of 1966. NSB was the only New Haven institution interviewed which did not
impose a depositor requirement of any kind.
42 Significantly, the institutions did not ask about the amount of the deposit, nor did
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the institution would grant the mortgage, large numbers of potential
borrowers were no doubt eliminated by the requirement that they be
depositors.
When many mortgage lenders in an area impose this requirement,
as they do in New Haven,43 borrowers may be limited to a single
institution in their search for mortgage funds. The mandatory tie-in
between savings services and mortgage credit thus has clear anticom-
petitive effects.44 In addition, the individual whose savings have gone
into other, perhaps more lucrative, investments would have less op-
portunity to negotiate a mortgage. The requirement that borrowers
also be depositors, without more foresight and public knowledge than
presently exist, would not seem to benefit the lending institution by
encouraging individuals to open savings accounts in a particular in-
stitution.45
According to statistical studies, marital difficulties do not account
for a large portion of mortgage delinquencies and defaults. 46 Never-
they inquire about savings deposits held in other institutions. This policy may appear to
be reminiscent of the requirement imposed by commercial banks that businesses which
negotiate bills with a particular bank maintain their checking accounts with that bank;
if anything goes wrong with the paper, the bank can simply debit the business's account.
However, such protection would seem unnecessary in the case of a mortgage, a secured
loan.
43 The requirement might make sound economic sense if depositors felt entitled to
receive loans at the place where they have deposited their savings, and would be angered
enough to shift their deposits if their loan applications were rejected. Exploring the
economic consequences of this practice would require a rather precise comparison of the
possible losses attributable to piqued depositors with the potential gains from granting
loans to optimal borrowers, a comparison which the institutions involved do not seem to
have made.
44 See note 41 supra.
45 This connection between the extension of mortgage credit and the servicing of
borrowers' savings accounts is an arrangement which, if applied on a larger scale, might
constitute an antitrust violation. Cf. Fortner v. United States Steel Corp., 594 U.S. 495
(1969); Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages, 79 YALE L.J. 254 (1969). It should
not matter that the tied product, in this case a savings service, was "purchased" before
the tying product, mortgage credit, if the arrangement is otherwise objectionable.
46 L. KENDALL, ANATOMY OF THE RasmENT.AL MORTGAGE 46 (1964), lists the following
reasons for delinquency and the corresponding. proportions of delinquencies for which
they were found to account:
(1) improper regard for obligations (33%);
(2) loss of income (27o);
(3) excessive obligations (18%);
(4) death or illness (12%);
(5) marital difficulties "(5%);
(6) other (5%).
A Veterans' Administration- study, based on explanations given by both lenders and
borrowers in 2,900 cases, revealed the following breakdown:
(1) curtailment of income (39%);
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theless, several New Haven institutions candidly reported an interest
in the steadiness and well-being of the applicant's marriage.47 One
loan officer apparently encouraged open discussion of marital strife,48
while another visited applicants in their homes. 49 Despite the difficulty
of forecasting separation or divorce over the twenty- or thirty-year
period of a mortgage agreement, marital peace was considered by one
lender to be "an almost determinative factor."50 This concern for
marital stability seems to be derived from an overemphasis on avoid-
ing foreclosure, which overlooks the fact that the cost of that contin-
gency can be effectively covered by adequate security.
A number of New Haven institutions mentioned an assortment
of considerations that, like marital instability, offer ample opportunity
for the exercise of subjective judgment and sheer guesswork. One loan
officer stressed "financial character," making it clear that in determining
financial character he placed more weight on personal characteristics
than on the individual's financial record reflected in credit bureau
figures.51 Another institution was looking for borrowers who were
"morally decent to the best of the bank's knowledge." 52 A third simply
stated that one of the initial decisions to be made about a loan appli-
cant is "whether he is the type of person you want coming in the door
in the first place."58 These considerations seem geared to maintaining
a clubby atmosphere marked by warm relationships between the lender
and its customers. Obviously such an emphasis can easily lead to
homogeneity among borrowers and the exclusion of outsiders and
minorities from the mortgage system.5
4
Although relying heavily on subjective responses to the personal
characteristics of the loan applicant and other irrelevant criteria, the
(2) improper regard for obligations (26%);
(3) death or illness (16%);
(4) marital difficulties (9%o);
(5) excessive obligations (7%);
(6) other (3%).
C. ABRAMS, THE CrrY Is THE FRONTIER 262 (1965).
47 FFSLNH, FNHNB, and NHSL.
48 NHSL.
49 FNHNB.
50 FFSLNH.
51 FNHNB.
-52 SNBNH.
53 HNB.
54 Many interviewees in New Haven, while commenting on the persistence of racial
discrimination in real estate marketing and sales, denied that racial discrimination was
present in their lending policies. NSB, PST, NHSL, FFSLNH, and FNHNB. Such protesta-
tions do not eliminate the possibility that the subjective criteria employed by those insti-
tutions can readily veil, discrimination.
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New Haven institutions expended little effort in analyzing the prop-
erty that would secure the loan, a major objective element in the loan
package. Connecticut lenders are required by law to appraise the
property offered as security,i 5 but few New Haven institutions went
beyond a cursory appraisal of the structural soundness and current
market value of the building. 6 Precise data on development and
property values in the suburban communities in which many loans
were placed was not sought.57 Many loan officers had only a general
notion of where the bulk of homes on which their institutions held
mortgages were located.58 Although the increased expenditures involved
in a careful analysis of economic trends arguably might not be justified
for a small institution, lack of information concerning the potential
value of properties accepted as security characterized the large institu-
tions as well as the small.
In effect, New Haven institutions appear to view the mortgage
loan as no different from an unsecured loan. Disregarding that fore-
closure need not result in financial loss, they tend to deny loans to
persons who pose any risk of default, rather than give the loan applicant
the benefit of the security. The uniformity of interest rates between
construction and purchase loans also prevails within the purchase loan
category itself. Borrowers are not permitted to bid up the price of
money; rather, the lender controls the rate and rations his funds among
a select group by use of such standards as depositor status and subjective
judgments as to the probability of default. The New Haven institutions
were apparently little influenced by a desire to earn profits or even by
a desire to make home ownership more widely available; they were
motivated by a genuine aversion to having to "take a house away from
someone." 9 As might be expected, the result of this emphasis has been
extremely low rates of delinquency, default, and foreclosure, in which
the institutions take some pride. 60
55 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 36-99(4),-178(h)(2) (1958).
56 E.g., "We are interested in the borrower and his qualities more than the security."
DSB.
57 Most institutions contended that they had a general grasp of the real estate picture.
The interviewers at HNB, NSB, NHSL, PST, SFSLNH, and UNHTC concluded that in
most cases this did not mean hard knowledge. In contrast, however, FNHNB and NHSB
had specific and pointed information.
58 Only NHSB reported that it was computerizing its loan portfolio to facilitate re-
trieval of information about its operations.
59 SNBNH.
60 HNB and ONB had no delinquencies and no foreclosures. CSB had five fore-
closures in two years. DSB had a foreclosure rate substantially under 1% and a delinquency
rate of 20/. FFSLNH had five foreclosures in 1968, slightly below its yearly average.
FNHNB had three foreclosures in its portfolio and a delinquency rate of 0.1%. NHSL had
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The New Haven institutions have undoubtedly paid a price in
earnings for satisfying their desire for smooth sailing. Yet their placidity
is socially harmful as well as financially unproductive. Fear of taking a
home away from someone may seriously limit an institution's willing-
ness to make home mortgage funds available in cases where any
modicum of risk is present, particularly when the loan officer is vested
with full discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the mortgage.61
In an active market a loan officer may normally be encouraged to lend
out funds at higher and higher interest rates. In New Haven, however,
very much a lender's market at the time of our interviews, loan officers
concentrated on finding the safest possible borrower. The loan officer's
decision would be reviewed, not if he 'were too conservative and denied
a loan application, but only if he erred on the side of risk and a later
delinquency occurred. Low rates of delinquency and foreclosure indi-
cate that loan officers are responsive to the pressures implicit in such a
review system, and that only those loan applicants who clearly pose no
danger of default will be deemed eligible for mortgage funds.
2. Los Angeles
In contrast, Los Angeles mortgage lenders gave consideration to
factors which are readily subject to quantification-income, outstand-
ing debts, and the value of the security-and gave no consideration to
factors that were of dubious relevance (depositor status), difficult to
ascertain (marital stability), or hopelessly vague and subjective (good
moral character). Mortgage lending in Los Angeles was bottomed on
a view of the mortgage as a security device. 62 As a result, heavy emphasis
was placed on the value of the property. Appraisal of the property often
preceded any further investigation of the loan applicant.63 As one
one foreclosure per year. PST had a foreclosure rate of less than 1%. SNBNH had three or
four foreclosures per year and a 1% delinquency rate. UNHTC had one delinquency per
year.
61 The discretion accorded the loan officer tends to vary with the size of the loan
requested and the assets of the lending institution: the more significant the risk in relation
to total assets, the more likely that the loan will require the approval of several lending
officers. At GWSL, an individual loan officer was authorized to approve loans of up to
$25,000; loans of from $25,000 to $50,000 required approval of the loan officer and his
supervisor; loans of from $50,000 to $100,000 required three signatures; loans of more
than $100,000 required the approval of the entire loan committee. NHSL, a small institution,
required that all loans be approved by the loan committee or the board of directors. In
most institutions, however, the typical home mortgage could be approved by a loan
officer without the need for clearance from his superiors. HNB (up to $50,000); SNBNH
(up to $35,000); UNHTC (up to $25,000).
62 "Since we were making secured loans, you could get a loan here if you could walk
in and sign your middle name." GWSL.
63 One loan officer described the process as follows:
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official explained: "Sure, we ask the borrower to tell us about his salary
and outstanding debts, but if he misrepresents to us [and then defaults],
he is the loser because we can always foreclose his mortgage."6 4
The Los Angeles institutions sought to measure not only the
borrower's ability to meet mortgage payments but the future value of
the security as well. 5 Some institutions employed generally available
economic studies and reports; 66 one maintained its own research depart-
ment.67 When this institution on one occasion was obliged to foreclose
a large construction loan, the research staff recommended that the
security (numerous tract homes) be held for rental and that resale be
deferred until a more favorable time. The recommendation was fol-
lowed and the institution ultimately made a profit.
68
Marginal loan applicants in Los Angeles, unlike those in New
Haven, were given the benefit of the security in the evaluation of their
loan applications. The risk of loss was not equated with the risk of
default, but rather with the possibility of a deficiency. Delinquency and
default on the part of some borrowers were accepted as normal, if
unpleasant, parts of an active mortgage lending program. Thus, many
Los Angeles institutions maintained regular staffs to deal with default
and foreclosure.69
Some institutions demonstrated a substantial degree of toughness
rather than an aversion to taking a house away from someone:
Some people just don't give a darn-you get all kinds of people, and
there are bound to be some problem cases.... [W]e have no sym-
pathy for the habitual delinquent. If possible, we will foreclose and
get him out of our portfolio.70
Because the security had been appraised with an eye to its sufficiency
First we get a call asking for the prospects for a loan on a certain property. We
then send out an appraiser and he makes an external inspection of the property.
We make a tentative commitment, based on a certain amount as down payment,
for a certain number of years, at a certain interest rate. If the deal goes through,
we make a second appraisal, based on an interior inspection, with special attention
to bad points. We look at the condition of the building, the kind of plumbing
facilities. We estimate the replacement cost, the land value, and so on. Then
we also weigh in three sales of similar property .... Then we obtain a credit
rating on the buyer.
GWSL.
04 CFSL.
65 ESL and GWSL.
66 USL.
67 GWSL.
68 Id.
69 GWSL, USL, and UnivSL.
70 CFSL. Another institution pursued a policy of moving rapidly towards foreclosure
after delinquency. "Most of our loans are in foreclosure before the sixtieth day of delin-
quency arrives." GWSL.
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in the event of default, foreclosure did not carry with it the overtones
of institutional failure as in New Haven. Fear.,of foreclosure, conse-
quently, did not bias the decision to grant the loan.
The contrast that emerges from the foregoing description of mort-
gage lending in New Haven and Los Angeles can be summarized as
follows: mortgage lenders in New Haven are motivated by an exag-
gerated concern for safety and a desire to avoid risk. They have
refrained from engaging in construction lending or direct equity in-
vestment even though higher returns might result and the subsequent
expansion of the housing supply would benefit the community. In
making home purchase loans they have effectively limited their lending
to a single class of low risk borrowers. They pride themselves on their
low rates of delinquency, default, and foreclosure, rather than on their
impact on housing construction, their fostering of home ownership, or
their rate of return.
In almost every respect, Los Angeles institutions exhibit a greater
concern for growth and earnings, one that has resulted in sizable
institutional development and has promoted substantial expansion of
the housing supply. Their decisions in structuring loan portfolios
demonstrate a willingness to accept higher risks in exchange for the
chance of high returns; Los Angeles lenders do not hesitate to under-
take construction lending and are actively exploring direct equity
investment. At the same time, borrowers and their security are carefully
analyzed so that the lender can make an intelligent estimate of the
risk or danger of deficiency. Thus, emphasis has been placed upon the
property securing the loan and upon lending at selective rates. 'Recep-
tivity to the marginal loan applicant has continued even during times
of tight money.
The Los Angeles profit-seeking method of operation offers more
hope for improving the performance of mortgage lenders as catalysts in
the production and distribution of housing. While New Haven institu-
tions are inhibiting housing construction by their unwillingness to
make construction loans even at premium rates or to promote develop-
ment themselves, Los Angeles lenders are embracing profitable oppor-
tunities in construction lending and equity investment. While New
Haven lenders are rejecting loan applicants based on irrelevant and
ill-defined standards which may allow subconscious bias to enter the
lending process, and which are applied without any possibility of
review, Los Angeles lenders are making loans more widely available by
stressing the value of the security and focusing on objective characteris-
tics of the potential borrower.
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II
MAKING MORTGAGE LENDERS RESPONSIVE
TO THE HOUSING SHORTAGE
This study did not include any control for determining with
certainty which of two variables is more important in promoting the
profit-seeking behavior exhibited by the Los Angeles institutions-the
stock format of organization, which predominates in Los Angeles, or
the larger size of many of the Los Angeles institutions.71 With a few
exceptions7 2 it appears that both the organization and, perhaps to a
lesser degree, the size of the institution are significant.7 3
A. Form of Organization
The evidence indicates that an important factor contributing to
the safety-maximizing behavior of the New Haven mortgage lenders is
their form of organization. The predominant mortgage lenders in Los
Angeles are the state-chartered savings and loan associations, which are
stock corporations. In New Haven, all savings banks and savings and
loan associations are mutual in form.74 The only stock corporations
among New Haven mortgage lenders are the commercial banks and
certain life insurance companies.
Unlike the garden variety corporation, mutual associations have
71 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
72 Some of the more aggressive institutions in Los Angeles are the giant federal
savings and loan associations (CFSL and GFSL) which, as those in New Haven, are
mutual associations. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. One official rejected
the view that mutual associations do not attempt to maximize profits. As he put it,
mutuals attempt to "maximize profits with risk factored out." CoFSL.
The aggressive activities of CFSL and GFSL may be explained by the pace-setting
influences of the stock associations with which they are in competition. There is a con-
stant interchange of ideas and, to a lesser extent, of personnel, between these institutions.
Alternatively, it may be that the large size of institutions has overcome the potential for
cautiousness inherent in the mutual form of organization.
The smaller Los Angeles stock associations (BSL, UnivSL) may be less venturesome
than the giants; however, a comparison of Los Angeles stock associations with California
mutual associations of the same size has demonstrated that the former are substantially
more venturesome. G. L.FooE, supra note 4, at 339-40; cf. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the
Small and in the Large, 32 ECONONEmEMCA 122 (1964).
Certain New Haven institutions (e.g., NHSL) of smaller size and mutual organization
exhibited some agressive tendencies. The national banks in New Haven, which are
stock corporations, were rather passive participants in the housing mortgage market.
73 Of course, there are other variables which may be important. One factor may be
the relative availability of credit in different areas and other regional differences. We have
concluded that these variables are not nearly as important as organizational format and
size. See note 14 supra.
74 See note 12 supra.
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no common stock; they are "owned" by their depositors. Their "divi-
dends" do not vary as they might if they reflected earnings or profits,
but are fixed over the short run and are essentially equivalent to inter-
est on deposits. Although depositors in these institutions possess voting
rights akin to those of corporate shareholders, 75 limitations on the
aggregation of such rights76 and the inability of the depositor to increase
his earnings beyond the interest he receives on his deposits have led
to apathy on the part of mutual depositors, and proxies are routinely
signed over to management or its nominees.77
Historically, mutual institutions were regarded as advantageous to
the little man.7 8 Indeed, when they were founded in the nineteenth
century these institutions provided a vital service in making mortgage
money and home ownership available to the middle class, a function in
which no other financial institutions then performed. The original
building and loan associations were often amateur organizations with-
out permanent offices or full time staff. The utilitarian function of the
association, its small size and its democratic aspects were attributes
which won a number of fervent supporters.
Today, however, savings banks and savings and loan associations
75 See note 76 infra. For example, depositors may be granted the right to obtain a
list of other depositors, one prerequisite for at least a rough form of "shareholder
democracy." Compare Ochs v. Washington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 17 N.Y.2d 82,
215 N.E.2d 485. 268 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966), with Daurelle v. Traders Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958).
76 4. Members. All holders of the association's savings accounts and all borrowers
therefrom are members. In the consideration of all questions requiring action
by the members of the association, each holder of a savings account shall be
permitted to cast one vote for each $100, or fraction thereof, of the withdrawal
value of his account. A borrowing member shall be permitted, as a borrower, to
cast one vote, and to cast the number of votes to which he may be entitled as the
holder of a savings account. No member, however, shall cast more than 50 votes.
12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1971) (mandatory charter provision for federal savings and loan
associations).
The Connecticut statute provides: "No member of any building or savings and loan
association shall be entitled to more than one vote in any meeting of such association."
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 36-175 (1958).
77 A regulatory official commented informally that:
There is no real difference between a stock association and a mutual-the
management in either case is out to milk the association for what they can. The
only difference is that the people who control the mutual have no stock to sell
on the market or to pass on to their kids, they have to find other ways of retain-
ing control. But it is absolutely impossible to wrest control from those who hold
it in a mutual. You know, when someone goes in to open up an account, he
doesn't care about his right to vote-he'll sign it right away to whoever is on the
proxy form-one man, or the board of directors.
Interview with Alvin Paley, Attorney, California Dep't of Say. & Loan, July 29, 1968.
78 See generally S. PRicE, BUILDING AND LOAN SOCIETIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND HISORY
(1958); J. SUNDHIEIm, THE LAW -or Bumuxnm AND LOAN AssOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933).
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have grown from modest beginnings to comparatively large size, own-
ing elegant office buildings and employing substantial full-time staffs;
those whose size and overhead have not expanded have, by and large,
fallen by the wayside. Along with increasingly large size, the develop-
ment of institutionalization, and the attendant lessening of significance
of the individual depositor, federal deposit insurance may have dimin-
ished depositors' incentive to involve themselves in the affairs of "their"
institutions. Real control of the mutual tends to reside in its permanent
management.79 The goal of management has been to defend the status
quo and avoid risk to whatever extent possible. When "profits" remain
after payment of interest on deposits, management tends to divert them
to larger salaries and increased benefits, 0 which may sometimes be
camouflaged as collateral sources of revenues' and various perquisites
of office.82
The example of the Los Angeles market suggests that conversion
of mutual financial institutions into stock corporations would contrib-
ute significantly to a lending attitude that would facilitate housing
construction and home purchase mortgages. By making management
more responsive to shareholder pressure for capital appreciation and
dividends, such a change would tend to push institutions into profit-
seeking behavior, such as allocating aditional funds to construction
lending. As in Los Angeles, institutional growth would become highly
important.
There is no evidence that growth of stock associations would lead
79 See note 77 supra; see also Nicols, Stock Versus Mutual Savings and Loan Associa-
tions: Some Evidence of Differences in Behavior, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 337 (1967). As one
savings and loan director commented, one symptom of this lack of control is a lack of
knowledge: "I do not believe that savings and loan depositors or shareholders are nearly
as well informed with respect to their directors' qualifications, as established by their
activities past and present, as are most corporate stockholders." Langhans, The Director
and the Association, 1966 SAv. & LOAN ANNALS 112, 113. But cf. Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson
& Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (breach of fiduciary duty by
majority shareholders in stock association).
80 See CONN. GEN. STAT. RIv. § 36-126(a)(1) (1958) (savings bank directors fixing own
compensation); Nicols, supra note 79, at 341; see also Kaufman's Estate, 35 T.C. 663 (1961),
aff'd per curiam, 800 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962).
81 Control of a major lender can provide substantial indirect income from associated
business enterprises such as title insurance, fire insurance, and escrowing. Cf. Southern Cal.
Title Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1967), vacated sub nom.
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 70 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1968).
82 Benefits may come indirectly-from the prestige of office, from the plush modem
buildings which many mutuals have constructed for themselves, or from expense accounts.
Officials at one federal association in Los Angeles candidly admitted, when asked what a
mutual seeks to maximize, that it attempts to maximize the security of its employees.
This goal was later-rephrased as- meaning "stability" and "growth." UFSL.
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to an undesirable level of risk or instability in the savings or mortgage
markets. New Haven type management might admittedly lose the
occupational security which it presently enjoys,83 but this is more likely
to lead to competent, innovative management than to irresponsibility.
The burden of institutional failure, an extremely unlikely eventuality,
would fall on the stockholders of the institutions, whose equity is con-
stantly at risk.84 Federal insurance through the FSLIC would continue
to protect depositors. FSLIC regulation designed to protect its interest
in sound management85 should combine with shareholder caution to
provide ample protection against mismanagement and unnecesary in-
stability.
Changes in the regulatory laws would be required to shift the
balance between mutuals and stocks in places like New Haven, where
the stock organization has traditionally been limited to commercial
banks. It is now impossible to obtain a charter for a stock federal or a
Connecticut state-chartered stock savings and loan association. It would
thus be desirable to enact legislation-either at the state or federal
level-authorizing the chartering of stock associations. Since. the oppor-
tunities for new associations may be limited by the financial hegemony
which mutuals have traditionally enjoyed, such legislation should also
authorize the conversion of existing mutual associations into stock form
upon the approval of depositors. Competition between mutual associa-
tions and stocks might well force the remaining mutuals into a profit-
maximizing stance 86 or, as one commentator has predicted, stock assb-
ciations might in time assume a dominant position.87
83 There is a high rate of management turnover in Los Angeles. ESL, UnivSL, USL,
SMSL. A decided inducement to perform is thus created for those involved in running the
institutions. USL. No similar turnover was evidenced in New Haven: apparently manage-
ment in New Haven changes only with the progress of natural life cycles. Cf. Nicols,
supra note 79, at 45, reporting that, between 1950 and 1964, turnover in the management
of stock associations was 18.9%, compared with 5.9% in the federal institutions.
84 The stockholders, in turn, exercise great influence because they are aware of their
rights and of the institution's performance as reflected in its financial figures and dividend
policies. Moreover, they are not restricted in purchasing adequate stock to obtain working
control.
85 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-30 (1970). See, e.g., id. § 1726(c) ("the Corporation shall reject
the application of any applicant if it finds that the capital of the applicant is impaired or
that its financial policies or management are unsafe') and § 1780(b) (termination of
insurance for, inter alia, unsafe or unsound business practices). FSLIC regulations govern-
ing sound banking operation are found in 12 C.F.R. § 563 (1971). See 1967 DuKE L.J. 1233,
1244.
86 As it apparently has in California. See CFSL, GFSL.
87 See Hester, Ownership and Behavior in the Savings and Loan Industry, in CON-
VERSION OF MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS TO STOCK Fom: LEGAL AND ECoNoMIC
IssUEs 30 (K. Scott & D. Hester eds. 1967).
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Enactment of a statute permitting the chartering of new stock
associations and conversion from mutual to stock is not the only step
that might be taken to undercut the dominance of mutual institutions
in many parts of the country. Stock associations, when chartered, must
be able to compete for savings accounts. Such competition is now
greatly hampered by the interest rate restrictions imposed by federal
regulation.s8 During the early 1960's Los Angeles institutions offered
interest rates consistently above those in other regions; thus they were
able to lure new deposits from throughout the country.89 Rates are
now held at a maximum of five percent by federal regulation, a
rate which is offered by nearly every institution. Competition for
deposits has shifted from the paying of higher interest to the offering
of meaningless or hard-to-evaluate frills.90 No rate competition between
stocks and mutuals will be possible until either rates fall below the
current ceiling or the ceiling is raised to permit competition.91
B. Size
Small size can prevent a lending institution from having a signifi-
cant impact on the housing supply. Financing a major construction
project, for example, would require many New Haven institutions to
place a substantial portion of their total capital in a single investment.
88 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board now has the power, after consultation with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, to limit the rate of return on deposits. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1425b(a), 1828(g)
(1970).
Rate regulation was formerly a function of FSLIC. On September 24, 1966, FSLIC
promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 569.3(a). 31 Fed. Reg. 12,596 (1966). This regulation established
a maximum interest rate of 4.75% on regular savings accounts. Section 569.3(c), promul-
gated simultaneously, permitted institutions in California, Nevada, and Alaska to pay
interest rates of up to 5.25%. On December 14, 1966, section 569.3(b) was amended to
establish numerous exceptions to the 4.75% limit, permitting institutions to pay up to 5%
in various situations. 31 Fed. Reg. 15,729 (1966). On June 8, 1967, section 569.3(c) was
amended to limit interest rates in California, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii to 5%. 82 Fed.
Reg. 8024 (1967). On December 25, 1969, 12 C.F.R. § 569.4-1(a) was promulgated to permit
the payment of up to 6% interest on certificate accounts of $10,000 or more deposited for
at least two years. 34 Fed. Reg. 20,266 (1966). This marks the highest rate ever allowed.
On August 4, 1970, the regulation of interest rates was transferred from FSLIC to
the FHLBB. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,388 (1970). The maximum rate on regular accounts has re-
mained at 5%, with a 6% limitation on the certificate accounts described above. See 12
C.F.R. § 526.3(a) (1971).
89 SMSL, USL, BHFSL, and SoFSL.
90 For a discussion of bank giveaway programs, see N.Y. Times, June 80, 1970, at
57, col. 8.
91 For a different criticism of the ceiling on interest rates, see Tobin & Ross, Living
with Inflation, N.Y. Rav. OF Booxs, May 6, 1971, at 23.
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The resulting concentration of risk would be contrary to sound finan-
cial management and might violate the regulatory statutes. 92 Moreover,
small size can prevent an institution from compiling adequate statistics
on which to base predictions of default and delinquency and may thus
promote a cautious lending policy. An institution may seek to avoid all
"problem loans" by lending only to the safest applicants, thus avoiding
the necessity of developing a specialized staff with experience in fore-
closure and property management. In short, small size can prevent the
lender from treating the mortgage as a secured transaction.93
The handicap of inadequate asset size must be overcome if institu-
tions such as those in New Haven are to become more deeply involved
in housing construction and less restrictive in their lending decisions.
One approach to this problem would be to promote the asset growth of
individual institutions, either by loosening interest rate restrictions,
thereby permitting more vigorous competition between savings associa-
tions and other investment sources, or by promoting consolidation and
branching. An alternative approach would be to accept present patterns
of institutional size, but to encourage joint action and the pooling of
information by smaller institutions.
The ceiling imposed on interest rates paid to depositors94 not only
inhibits home financing competition between savings institutions 5 but
is also a barrier to their growth. Imposed as a check against irresponsi-
ble rate inflation and as a means of ensuring parity between commercial
banks and savings associations, the ceiling has effectively eliminated all
meaningful competition between savings associations and other recipi-
ents of investment funds. In addition, the interest ceiling is pitifully
low in relation to inflation 0 Either complete abolition of the ceiling
92 Federal savings and loan associations are compelled by statute to place the vast
majority of their funds in mortgages on single family dwellings ranging in value up to
$45,000. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970). No more than 20% of their assets may be loaned on
the security of multi-unit dwellings. Id. § 1464(c).
93 A striking example of the impact of asset size can be seen in New London,
Connecticut, where the relatively large federal savings and loan association (with assets
of $42 million), in 1968 shortened its grace period (during which a delinquent borrower
may cure his delinquency) from 30 to 15 days, largely owing to efficiencies resulting
from computerization. New London Federal had several attorneys handling foreclosures.
Interview with William T. Douton, Jr., supra note 25. At precisely the same time, the
smaller New London Savings & Loan was carrying delinquent borrowers for as long as
five months and had had no foreclosures in two years. Interview with C.W. Sevin, Secre-
tary, First New London Savings & Loan, Inc., Nov. 20, 1968.
94 Note 88 supra.
95 See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
96 The maximum interest payable on regular savings accounts has been fixed at 5%
per year. See note 88 supra. The course of inflation is traced in the following table:
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or its increase to a level where mortgage lenders can compete effectively
for investment funds is necessary if more of those funds are to be
channelled into housing. The desire of lending institutions to pay
depositors as little as necessary should be sufficient to stabilize the inter-
est rate paid to depositors. Alternatively, the interest rate ceiling could
be raised in stages, with close examination of the impact of successive
increases on institutional assets and on housing.
Another remedy for the problem of limited assets would be the
adoption of a deliberate policy of promoting institutional expansion by
the agencies charged with regulating savings institutions. Consolidation
of a failing institution with a stronger one has been a common prac-
tice;97 it should be continued with particular attention to the resulting
aggregation of assets. For example, if it appears that the incremental
benefits of increased size fall off sharply after a certain size is attained,
a regulatory agency might seek to plan consolidations so that the re-
sulting institutions have optimal asset size. In addition, the regulatory
agencies might adopt a broader view of what constitutes the public
interest, a standard they are usually compelled to respect.98 In passing
upon applications for new branch locations, for example, an agency
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Year All Items
1965 94.5
1966 97.2
1967 100.0
1968 104.2
1969 109.8
1970 116.3
1971 (Sept.) 122.4
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS, OCT. 1971, at 26 (1971).
1 Although both the rate of inflation and the rate of interest paid on deposits rose
during the period before the Presidential wage-price freeze, inflation increased at a
faster rate and finally denied savings depositors any genuine income on their savings.
97 ESL was the result of one such merger. A similar consolidation of associations in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, in 1953, was noted by an official in the Connecticut Banking
Department. Interview with Reinhard J. Bardeck, supra note 11.
The process is generally one of compromise. As described by an inside observer: "In
a forced merger situation, the Commissioner just gets all the guys together and they
hash it out." Interview with Alvin Paley, supra note 77.
98 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 86-173(3) (Supp. 1969):
The commissioner, before approving such articles of association and issuing
a certificate of authority, shall consider: (a) The character and experience of
the proposed directors and officers; (b) the adequacy of existing financial facilities
in the town; (c) the convenience and necessity to the public of the proposed
facility; (d) that conditions in the locality in which the proposed association will
transact business afford reasonable promise of successful operation; (e) that the
establishment of a new building or savings and loan association will not harm
an existing financial institution to a hazardous degree.
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might consider not only whether another branch in a given locality
would serve the interests of potential depositors,99 but also whether
further expansion of the institution's assets would be in the public
interest. Such a consideration would be particularly appropriate in the
common situation where more than one institution is seeking approval
to branch into a particular locality. By giving more attention to the
effects its decisions can have on institutional size, the regulatory agency
could do much to promote home and construction lending.
Finally, to the extent that institutional size cannot be sufficiently
increased by the above measures, efforts should be made to facilitate
joint action and pooling of information by individual institutions. One
way to reduce the high concentration of risk that large projects entail
is exemplified by the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) created by the Housing Act of 1968.100 GNMA is authorized
to issue securities backed by a pool of government insured mortgages
bought from traditional lending institutions. GNMA can thus offer
investors easily marketed securities and provide lenders with a pur-
chaser for large project mortgages. A small lender would be able to
write a relatively large mortgage and then sell it to GNMA. By making
repeated sales to GNMA, a smaller institution could develop the ex-
pertise needed for large or intricate projects. 01 In turn, GNMA should
aim at purchasing those large mortgages (for example, multi-unit dwell-
ings) which many small lenders might be willing to arrange if they
could be sold in a secondary mortgage market.
The sale of participations, partial interests in a pool of mortgage
loans, by the originating institution to others seeking investment oppor-
tunities may be an additional method for spreading the risks of large
projects. 0 2 Participations can permit smaller institutions to join safely
99 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 6002 (West 1958):
If the commissioner is satisfied that the operation of the proposed branch
is in the interest of such association, that the area where the proposed branch is
to be located is not adequately served by one or more existing associations or
federal savings and loan associations, that such association's financial program
is sound, and that the public convenience and advantage will be promoted by
the operation of such branch, he shall issue a license for the proposed branch.
100 Act of Aug. 1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 526, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23 (1970).
GNMA may provide additional security. Id. § 1720.
101 A loan official at NSB said that a bank as small as his could not bother keeping
up with government programs other than FHA and GI loans. DSB, NHSL, SFSLNH, and
FNHNB mentioned a lack of expertise in dealing with complex paperwork as the reason
for their noninvolvement in governmental programs.
102 CONN. GEN. STAT. RXV. § 36-99(16) (1958) (participation authorized for Connecticut
savings banks); id. § 36-178(z) (participation authorized for Connecticut savings and loan
associations); 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.9-1 to -2 (1971) (FSLIG regulations on participations). Cf.
note 15 supra.
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in large projects, either by arranging the project and then selling a
portion of it to other institutions, or by purchasing a share in a project
arranged by another lender. Wider utilization of participations would
allow small lenders to-specialize in arranging particular types of loans
and to balance their portfolios by participation in a variety of larger
loans.
Participations may be hampered, however, by present state-by-state
variations in foreclosure laws. 103 To the extent that the purchasing insti-
tution is not protected by a buy-back provision in the participation agree-
ment, the difficulty and complexity of foreclosure laws may deter it
from purchase. Existing foreclosure laws may work well to protect the
owners of single-family dwellings from hasty eviction and loss of equity.
However, those laws should be modified at least for foreclosures of
multi-unit dwellings, where the aim of the foreclosing lender will
normally be only to obtain legal title and not to evict present tenants.
It would undoubtedly be beneficial if the states were to adopt more
expeditious procedures for foreclosing nonowner occupied properties.
By increasing the attractiveness of mortgages secured by such prop-
erties, a modification of the foreclosure laws would draw more capital
into the private housing market.
Small size can also have an unfortunate influence upon a lender's
knowledge of potential risk and ability to deal with default. Many New
Haven institutions, for example, lacked the volume of transactions
necessary to develop reliable statistics and to permit risk-taking in re-
turn for the possibility of a higher overall rate of return. Larger institu-
tions can engage in internal studies and make relatively accurate predic-
tions of risk,104 but smaller institutions cannot.10 5 Mechanisms should
be established for the compilation of statistical data, its systematic
evaluation, and distribution of the information thus obtained. Such
action could be undertaken cooperatively by the small institutions in-
volved or by a regulatory agency.100 A cooperative arrangement could
also be established to handle defaults and foreclosures.
103 See Durfee & Dodderidge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Mortgage Act, 23 MicH. L. RiEv. 825, 839 (1925). United States v. Stadium Apartments,
425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), holding that FHA foreclosure
proceedings are not governed by state redemption statutes, represents a step forward in
this area.
104 GWSL and GFSL.
105 Of course, even precise knowledge of the general incidence of risk would not
fully protect such institutions, for a single large default might be disastrous.
106 In 1968, the California Department of Savings and Loan began to implement a
computerized system designed to evaluate the financial positions of institutions under its
jurisdiction. Interview with Frederick M. Rammler, Administrative Ass't to the Comm'r,
[Vol. 57:149
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CONCLUSION
The remedies suggested are by no means panaceas for the ills of
either the mortgage or the housing markets. The former will continue
to suffer from the inherent difficulty of lending for long periods at fixed
interest rates with no assurance that today's rate will result in a return
adequate to pay the interest needed to retain tomorrow's depositors.107
The latter is plagued by inefficiencies in construction, serious cyclical
variations, and continued inflation, all of which make decent housing
an unattainable goal for millions of lower income Americans.
Nonetheless, there is ample opportunity for improvement of the
present system. By embracing a more venturesome, profit-seeking, and
informed investment style, lending institutions such as those in New
Haven can achieve the level of responsiveness to both individual and
societal needs exhibited by those in Los Angeles.
Cal. Dep't. of Sav. & Loan, July 26, 1968. The system produces a quarterly "Early Warning
Report" on each association, consisting of selected data and various key ratios, which are
placed in historical perspective by inclusion of similar data for the nine previous quarters.
Such information has proved reliable in pointing out institutions having financial diffi-
culty. The reports are limited to internal use. Letter from Daine P. Jones, Chief Examiner,
Cal. Dep't of Sav. & Loan to the Author, Nov. 9, 1971, on file at the Cornell Law Review.
Such a system could provide a model for the more complicated task of developing data
to predict economic changes which could affect interest rates, demand for mortgages, and
savings withdrawals.
107 A variable interest rate is one method of dealing with this problem. Under a
variable rate plan, interest on mortgages would be tied directly either to the rate of
interest which the lender paid its depositors, or to some other variable. The lender's
role under such a scheme would directly reflect its status as an intermediary between
those who wished to save and those seeking to borrow. Some experimentation with a
variable rate has been conducted. CoFSL. Cf. Lefcoe, Monetary Correction and Mortgage
Lending in Brazil: Observations for the United States, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 106 (1968).
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APPENDIX A
INSTITUTIONS INTERVIEWED: NEW HAVEN
1967 Assets
Institution Identification (millions) Date of Interview
Connecticut Savings Bank
Dime Savings Bank
of Wallingford
National Savings Bank
of New Haven
New Haven Savings Bank
People's Savings & Trust
of Bridgeport
New Haven Savings & Loan
Association
First Federal Savings &
Loan of New Haven
Second Federal Savings &
Loan of New Haven
City Trust Co. of Bridgeport
(Milford Branch)
Union & New Haven Trust Co.
First New Haven
National Bank
Hamden National Bank
Orange National Bank
Second National Bank of
New Haven
244.1
32.2
NHSB
PST
NHSL
FFSLNH
SFSLNH
CTC
UNHTC
FNHNB
HNB
ONB
SNBNH
269.7
545.6
21.7
177.2
28.3
269.5
128.8
253.2
13.0
6.2
159.2
March 28, 1969
April 2, 1969
July 22, 1969
March 25, 1969
April 2, 1969
April 24, 1969
March 28, 1969
May 2, 1969
July 15, 1969
March 27, 1969
March 25, 1969
March 28, 1969
April 10, 1969
March 26, 1969
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1967 Assets
Institution Identification (millions) Date of Interview
Beverly Hills Federal
Savings & Loan
California Federal
Savings & Loan
Coast Federal Savings
& Loan
Glendale Federal Savings
& Loan
Southern Federal Savings
& Loan
Union Federal Savings
& Loan
Wilshire Federal
Savings & Loan
Belmont Savings & Loan
Equitable Savings & Loan
Financial Savings & Loan
Great Western Savings
& Loan
Lincoln Savings & Loan
State Mutual Savings
& Loan
United Savings & Loan
University Savings
& Loan
BHFSL 152.4 July 1, 1968
CFSL
CoFSL
GFSL
SoFSL
UFSL
WFSL
BSL
ESL
FSL
GWSL
LSL
SMSL
USL
UnivSL
1,489.8
707.3
813.7
116.0
122.6
July so, 1968
Aug. 1, 1968
Aug. 20, 1968
June 26, 1968
July 29, 1968
82.1 June 27, 1968
138.9
295.5
73.7
835.1
482.8
334.7
270.3
9.0
June 19, 1968
June 25, 1968
June 26, 1968
July 23-Aug. 1, 1968
June 28, 1968
June 24, 1968
June 27, 1968
July 30, 1968
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APPENDIX B
INSTTUTIONS INTviEwED: Los ANGELES
